Is nuclear deterrence infallible?

August 6th is the 70th anniversary of the nuclear destruction of Hiroshima.

We still have these weapons.

The key question about nuclear weapons is this: Is the deterrence system infallible? Is it impossible that in any circumstances whatsoever, nuclear armed politicians would actually fire these weapons?

The answer to this is negative. There could be a confluence of political tension, military engagement, and technical breakdown in the early warning systems that could persuade one or other of the nuclear powers that an attack was under way. In which case a general nuclear holocaust would ensue, which would almost certainly bring an end to human civilisation.

If the consequence of breakdown of a system is infinitely destructive, you employ that system if and only if the possibility of its breakdown is zero.

Since the possibility of breakdown of deterrence is greater than zero, we must disable and dismantle all nuclear weapons.

Thinking logically about Trident

Mary Dejevski writes in the Independent today (The nationalists, the whistleblower and a chance to think about Trident, p 28, 19 May) hopes that the scrutiny of Trident will go beyond the specific complaints made by the courageous whistleblower, William McNeillie. If only we could hope for such scrutiny.

Here is the ultimate question about Trident:

Is there a greater than zero probability of its being fired?

If the answer to that question is an unqualified no, then we can safely continue with it, although there are questions about its cost and the potential for accidents, but these downsides can be balanced by Trident's effect in raising the threshold at which nuclear weapons states will declare war on us.

If the answer is yes, there is a chance that it could be fired, then we must abandon the whole idea of nuclear deterrence, and work intensively to ensure a global ban on all such WMD.

There is a cast iron reason for this: if the consequence of the breakdown of a system is infinitely destructive, it is reasonable to use that system if and only if the probability of its breakdown is zero.

Any examination of the history and structure of nuclear deterrence will quickly conclude that there is a greater than zero chance of deterrence failing.

In that case, Trident will be the trigger for, or part of, a global nuclear holocaust, with all 17,000 being fired or destroyed in their silos. That will destroy human civilisation - an infinitely negative consequence.

That being the case, we must put an end to the Trident programme. If between them the SNP and William McNeilly have started a radical, logical reappraisal of nuclear deterrence, they will have done the whole world an immense favour.

Lobby against the irrational Trident WMD

CND is lobbying against the replacement of our Trident WMD system.

My MP, John Penrose, is minister for Tourism, and therefore will not sign EDMs.

So this is what I wrote:

Dear John,

I know you will not and cannot consider signing EDM 96 Trident Replacement.

The EDM highlights the conclusions of the Government's own National Security Strategy that the threat of a nuclear attack by another state is of low likelihood.

Following on from that, the EDM is a simple statement of opposition to Trident replacement, highlighting its £25 billion procurement cost and £100 billion lifetime cost.

The conclusion is that there are better things to spend the money on, whether within the Ministry of Defence or in other Ministries.

The key point that I would like again to remind you of is that if Trident is ever used, it will be as part of a general exchange that will almost certainly put an end to human civilisation in its present form.

It is reasonable to use a system whose failure means such a cost if and only if the chance of its failure is zero. The chance of a filure of the nuclear deterrence system is greater than zero, therefore, in supporting the nuclear deterrence system, you are supporting an irrational policy, as well as wasting a significant amount of taxpayers' money.




This is very sad.

Richard

see also - 12 steps to getting rid of Trident

Trident, Nuclear Deterrence and Logic

CND is asking us to write to Gideon re: Trident, which I urge all to do.

This is my 2p on the topic:

Nuclear Deterrence and Logic

If the consequences of the failure of a system would be infinitely destructive to a civilisation, it is reasonable for that civilisation to use that system if and only if the probability of its failure are zero. The argument here is that there is a greater than zero chance of nuclear deterrence leading to nuclear war, and that war would be infinitely destructive of human civilisation, leading to the conclusion that the world needs to scrap nuclear weapons absolutely and completely.

The possession of nuclear weapons by a number of states in the international community does constitute a system, that is, a group of interrelated parts forming a whole.

Can the system fail? Nuclear deterrence is a complex arrangement of electronic sensors embedded in a command and control network composed of humans working to hard protocols that are interwoven with pattern judgments and valuations which are affected by the emotional state of the individuals and groups that make the judgments. The groups themselves, particularly the supreme decision making groups, are isolated from the common body of humanity, and are known to be susceptible to a condition known as group think – defined as A mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.[i] Moreover, the interplay of decision makers is now far more complex than in the days of the cold war, with players coming on to the field who might not view the destruction of the prevailing world civilisation as a thing to be avoided at all costs, and other players already on the scene who believe that nuclear weapons could be used tactically without risking a strategic exchange.

In short, it is entirely reasonable to judge that the probability of failure of the nuclear deterrence system is greater than zero. [ii]

Would the breakdown of the nuclear deterrence be infinitely destructive? This is point that must be settled by a value judgment. First, would it be possible to get away with a limited exchange, or would one nuclear detonation inevitably escalate into an all out global nuclear war?

It is impossible to give a definitive answer to that question, but the safest assumption to make is that if one weapon is detonated, they will all be fired. The reason for this lies in the doctrine of first strike, which aims to destroy the opponent’s weapons before they can be fired. Once it is known that an opponent has detonated a nuclear weapon, the pressure will be on for supreme commanders to fire all their nuclear weapons before they lose them to a first strike. In view of this, although we cannot say that any exchange would inevitably lead to a first strike, it would be the height of folly for anyone to assume that they could use weapons in a limited tactical strike and believe that matters would then be allowed to rest by the opposition. Unfortunately this is the prevailing nuclear doctrine of the United States of America. They consider that nuclear weapons could be used tactically, as an extension of a conventional military campaign. In doing so, they may trigger an all-out nuclear war.

Would an all out strategic nuclear exchange be infinitely destructive? There are estimated to be at least 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world held by at least eight countries, 96 percent of them in the possession of the United States and Russia. [iii]

The effects of all-out nuclear war were well studied in the 1980s. Physically, the most interesting possible effect is the so-called Nuclear Winter, where atmospheric soot cuts off sunlight for a period of weeks or months.[iv] When the sunlight returns, the effects of city and forest fires will have been to increase the atmospheric CO2 load, thus exacerbating global warming. Species loss will increase, secondary to habitat loss. Of these, the loss of bees will be most important, since cessation of their pollination services will lead to failure of such crops as survivors may try to plant. Ironically, rats and cockroaches are resistant to radiation, and so will flourish, given the plentiful quantities of human and animal carrion available.

To say the least, economic growth after a nuclear war would be unlikely. In fact a global economic recession or even a depression is almost inevitable, and to be replaced by a survival economy based around obtaining water, food, warmth and shelter for the group. Life will be short, and cancers plentiful, but health services would be rudimentary, and analgesics in short supply. Gangsterism will flourish, and self interest is likely to become the norm.

In summary, it is entirely reasonable to expect that an all out nuclear exchange would lead to the end of western civilisation. It would therefore be infinitely destructive.

In terms of the model set out at the beginning, the consequences of the failure of a nuclear deterrence system would indeed be infinitely destructive to our civilisation, the probability of its failure is greater than zero, and therefore it is illogical for our civilisation to use that system.

Since the syllogism contains a value judgment, and there will inevitably be others who take a different view. However, they are compelled to argue either that the deterrence system is perfectly safe, which is manifestly not the case, or that a tactical weapon would not lead to an all-out nuclear war, which is clearly not provable, or that an all-out nuclear war would not destroy civilisation, which is clearly unreasonable.

In the circumstances, however, because of the uncertainties involved, it is safer to take a precautionary view. The great majority of humanity view the possibility of all out nuclear war with a great deal of distaste. They should be helped to understand that the nuclear deterrence system is not infallible, and that these weapons are quite capable of being used in anger. This should then motivate them to exercise their democratic right and duty to remove from political office anyone who believes that it is reasonable for any state to possess nuclear weapons.

Dr Richard Lawson

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[i] Janis, Irving L. Victims of Groupthink. Boston. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972, page 9.

[ii] Lachlan Forrow and others, "Accidental Nuclear War --A Post Cold War Assessment," NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE Vol. 338, No. 18 (April 30, 1998), pgs. 1326-1331

[iii] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons (4 June 2007)

[iv] Nuclear winter: Physics and physical mechanisms," R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack and C. Sagan, Ann. Rev. Earth and Planet. Sci., 19, 383-422 (1991).

Would you buy an Insurance Policy from Trident Tony?

Michael White reports in the Guardian (March 15) that a cross party majority of MPs voted for renewing the Trident "insurance policy". This is a poor reflection on the reasoning ability of pro-WMD MPs.

The “insurance policy” is a powerful argument at the emotional level; after all, who would like to go into an uncertain future without insurance of some kind? Insurance is good and sensible. Prudent, even.

But the insurance metaphor does not stand up to scrutiny. With insurance, we pay a certain amount of money regularly into a common fund. The fund increases, and if in time Something Bad happens to one of those paying into the fund, that person receives an amount of money from the fund which enables them to make good the loss that they have sustained. It is impossible to make this analogy with WMD.

In the case of Trident, we certainly pay (£75 billion going on to £100 billion) into a fund, but it is not a common fund in the sense that any number of other nations pay into it for mutual benefit. But if we did accept for the sake of argument that we in the UK are all paying in to some kind of common security policy in Trident, what do we get out of it if Something Bad (i.e. a nuclear attack on our country) happens? Do we get an amount of money to make good the damage done to our nation by the attack? No. What we get is the satisfaction that the person or persons who launched the nuclear attack on us will suffer just as much death, injury, burns, destruction, disruption, disease, misery and cancer as we have suffered. If not more.

The insurance argument is backed up by Ministers for Mass Destruction when they say we cannot know what will happen in the future. Yes we do. If the UK persists in clinging to its WMD safety blanket, other tin-pot dictatorships will want the same thing. Nukes will proliferate, and the probability of a nuclear war will approach unity. In other words, we will blow ourselves up.

So Trident is in no way analogous to an insurance policy, and in describing it as such, Prime Minister Blair is showing us once again what a stranger he is to the truth.

See also: Nuclear Deterrence and Logic